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THE LEGAL STATUS OF A BOARD OF ZONING
APPEALS
By GE RGE A. WARP*
The powers and duties of boards of zoning appeals in the
several states do not vary significantly.1 They are set up to see
that "the public health, safety, morals and general welfare may
be secured and substantial justice done". 2 Their function is
that of providing a measure of flexibility in the application of
a general rule imposed for the good of all.3 Their powers are
limited to those cases where legislative action is impracticable
and where the ordinance if literally applied would work an un-
necessary hardship, remediable without damage to neighboring
property.4 They cannot act until a property owner appeals
for an exception to the general provisions of the ordinance, alleg-
ing in his appeal that, due to some exceptional conditions, it is
necessary that his parcel of land be dealt with in a manner
different from that set up for the district in which the land is
located, in order that he be allowed to enjoy a substantial prop-
erty right in the land in question. Then, upon a showing of
"unnecessary hardship", s general rules are suspended for the
benefit of individual owners, and special privileges established. 6
Should the property owner's petition be denied by the board of
appeals, he may throw the matter into the courts.
* A. B., Adelbert College of Western Reserve University, 1935;
Lecturer in Political Science, Adelbert College.
2W. L. Pollard, "Analysis of Zoning Ordinances", The Annals,
Vol. 155, P. 65 (May, 1931).
2L. & M. Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N. E. 379
(1932).
3 Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N. Y. 221, 177 N. E. 427
(1931); People, ex rel., Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh,
244 N. Y. 280, 155 N. E. 575 (1927); Provo City v. Claudin, 91 Utah 60,
63 P. (2d) 571 (1936).
4 J. L. Crane, Jr., "Progress In the Science of Zoning", The Annals,
Vol. 155, p. 199 (May, 1931). See Provo City v. Claudin, 91 Utah 60,
63 P. (2d) 571 (1936).
$The courts have held that there must be some general principle,
such as that of "unnecessary hardship", to direct the board as to the
exercise of its judgment and discretion in issuing or denying the per-
mit. Kilgour v. Gratto, 224 Mass. 78, 112 N. E. 489 (1916); L. & M.
Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N. E. 379 (1932).
4W. L. Pollard, op. cit.; L. & M. Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio
St. 12, 180 N. E. 379 (1932).
K. L. J.--5
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It is for the courts to determine whether the general rule
laid down in the zoning ordinance is a sufficient measure or guide
for the action of the administrative board,7 whether the action of
the board of appeals is justified under the general rule laid
down,s and whether the facts disclosed really represent a condi-
tion which calls for special attention or merely relate to condi-
tions applicable to all property in the district subject to the
disputed restrictions. 9 The courts, to be sure, do not absolutely
deny the exercise of discretionary powers to the boards of
appeals. They generally recognize the fact that "a limited
discretion is plainly essential to the practical application of the
prescribed plan"1O They point out that their power to modify
or revise does not include the power to substitute their own.
discretion for that of the board."' Before arriving at a judg-
ment either reversing or modifying the decision appealed from,
the court must find that the board either acted illegally or
abused its discretion. 2
In dealing with these general rules of guidance the courts
in their decisions have shown a surprisingly liberal trend. Of
the more recent cases, only that of Wlton v. Hamilton, 3 an
Illinois case, is based upon the old notion of strictly separated
powers. The highest court in the state declared: "The board
of appeals is not a court but an administrative board which has
no judicial powers and the hearing before it is not a judicial
proceeding." The court pointed out that the board was exer-
cising improperly delegated authority and was violating the
principles of separation of powers; consequently, boards of zon-
ing appeals were held unconstitutional. Thus, in Illinois, sub-
'People, ex rel., Schimpff v. Norwell 368 Ill. 325 13 N. E. (2d)
960 (1938); Spencer-Sturla v. Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S. W. 608
(1927).
8Neithamer v. Heyer, 39 Ohio App. 532, 177 N. E. 925 (1931).
9In re Levy v. Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of
New York, 267 N. Y. 347, 196 N. E. 284 (1935).
"R. B. Construction Co. v. Jackson, 152 Md. 671, 137 A. 278 (1927).
u Piccolo v. Town of West Haven, 120 Conn. 449, 181 A. 615 (1935).
'2Ibid., at 618; Smith v. Sellingman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S. W. (2d) 14
(1937); People, ex rel., Novick Holding Corp. v. Murdock, 246 App.
Div. 745, 283 N. Y. S. 762 (1935); Burr v. Rago, 120 Conn. 287, 18 A.
(2d) 444 (1935).
- 344 Ill. 82, 176 N. E. 333 (1931).
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stantial variations must be secured by amendment. 14 In cases
arising in the other states, however, courts- take the view that
the old principles must be applied to the changed facts of
modern life. Decisions handed down in the days of the, horse
and buggy "would be incongruous now if not considered in the
light of modern industrial and civic development". 15 The case
of Tighe v. Osborne16 best represents this changed view. Here,
it was admitted that the language of some of the earlier deci-
sions was in conflict with the new notion of delegation of legis-
lative power, but certainly the more modern decisions amply
and specifically sustain it. The change, if there has been any,
is due to the constantly increasing complexity of modern society
and the consequent multiplicity of matters which require the
state's attention. The field has become so vast, and the things
to be considered so enlarged in number and so interrelated with
one another, that it has been found practically impossible to
provide in laws and ordinances specific rules and standards by
which every conceivable situation can be measured and deter-
mined. The result has been that we have turned more and more
to the plan of providing in our laws and ordinances general rules
and standards, and leaving to administrative boards and agen-
cies the task of acquiring information, working out the details,
and applying these rules and standards to specific cases.
Such ordinances represent no change in principle; they merely
indicate that the courts, faced by at least an apparent necessity,
have relaxed to some extent the particularity with which they
formerly required the laws and ordinances to set out the rules
and standards by which the delegated power was to be limited,
and whatever may be said of the wisdom of this relaxation, no
doubt can now be entertained as to its sanction by the great
weight of authority in this country.
This matter of hearing cases and making exceptions, involv-
ing as it does the exercise of the police power, is judicial in
nature. Consequently most jurisdictions are inclined to hold
that the action of the board in making or recommending a special
exception, must be made to rest upon legal evidence tending to
21 It is Interesting to note that an amendment by a city council
may be as arbitrary as an exception by a board of appeals. In the
former Instance equity grants relief by declaring the exercise of the
power Illegal, not by declaring it unconstitutional.
"Colby v. Board, 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443 (1927).
"150 Md. 452, 133 A. 465 (1926).
KxNTucKy LAw JouRNAL
establish facts justifying the action. 17 The weight to be given
to the various types of evidence is primarily for the board to
determine. Unless there is clear indications to the contrary, it
is assumed that the preponderance of the evidence is in accord-
ance with the final decision of the board.' 8 New York courts
go so far as to refuse to bind the board to follow the ordinary
rules of evidence applicable to actions in the courts.' 9 Indeed,
some cases actually hold that the board may arrive at a deter-
mination on the basis of its own independent investigation.20
The great weight of New York decisions, however, seems at
present to be in the minority.
The boards are bound to execute the provisions of the zon-
ing ordinances, regardless of validity. They cannot pass upon
the constitutionality of city ordinances. 21  While the construe-
tion given by a board in carrying out its duty of execution is
always entitled to the most respectful consideration and ought
not be overruled without cogent reasons,2 2 such construction is
in no way binding on the courts. 23
In brief, the exercise of the powers which are essentially
judicial in character has been upheld with few exceptions by
courts in the various states. Yet certain qualities of a judicial
tribunal, such as that of refusing to enforce an unconstitutional
law or ordinance, have been denied to these "administrative
agencies". Furthermore, boards of zoning appeals have no
power to enforce their decisions. They make decrees, but they
must rely on the courts to inject teeth into them. Then, too, they
have no more power of final determination in their field than an
administrative official has in his field.
21Schnell v. Township Committee of Ocean Twp., - N. J. L. -,
198 A. 759 (1938); Somers v. Bradley Beach, 115 N. J. L. 135, 178 A.
755 (1935); Hendey v. Ackerman, 103 N. J. L. 305, 136 A. 733 (1927).
"Roberts v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket,
- R. I. -, 197 A. 461 (1938).
"'People, ex rel., Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh, 244
N. Y. 280, 155 N. E. 575 (1927); Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Murdock,
165 Misc. Rep. 713, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 574 (1937); People, ex rel., Broad-
way and 96th St. Realty Co. v. Walsh, 203 App. Div. 468, 196 N. Y. S.
672 (1922).
2 Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Murdock, 165 Mis. Rep. 713, 1 N. Y. S.
(2d) 574 (1937).
2 Municipal Gas Co. of City of Albany v. Nolon, 121 Misc. Rep. 606,
201 N. Y. S. 582 (1923).
"Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich. 282, 260 N. W. 165 (1935).
"Paye v. City of Grosse Pointe, 279 Mich. 254, 271 N. W. 826
(1937).
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The legal status of a board of zoning appeals is brought out
more clearly when similar boards operating under general rules
are considered. As the Supreme Court of Ohio pointed out
recently:
We see no distinction in principle between the use of a fact-finding
body to determine whether or not "unusual hardships" have resulted in
specific cases and the use of a similar administrative agency to ascer-
tain the fact whether a picture film is of a moral, educational, or harm-
less character.u Manifestly, since unusual hardships would affect some
and not other owners in a zoning district, the determination whether
the restriction imposes unusual hardships upon an individual's prop-
erty must be left, in specific instances, to the discretion of adminis-
trative agencies."
The Board of Tax Appeals is a Federal agency exercising
functions similar to those performed by a board of zoning
appeals. It was established by the Revenue Act of 1924 to hear,
consider, and decide whether specific deficiencies reported by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue were correct. Its purpose
was to give taxpayers an opportunity to secure an independent
review of the Commissioner's determination of additional income
and estate taxes by the Board in advance of their paying the tax
found by the Commissioner to be due.26 While the Board is not
a court, it exercises appellate powers judicial in character. Its
decision presents a case or controversy between the taxpayer and
the Government so as to authorize review by the court upon the
Commissioner's petition. The Board exercises functions similar
to those exercised by a trial court in a law case without a jury.T
It is said that the Board is an executive or administrative agency,
upon the decision of which the parties are given opportunity to
base a petition for review to the courts after the administrative
inquiry of the Board has been had and decided.28
Another illustration is furnished by the various laws per-
taining to employers' liability and workmen's compensation, in
which common law rules have been altered, or even abolished,
24 L. & M. Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 23, 180 N. E. 379
(193 2), citing Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236
U. S. 230, 59 L. Ed. 552, 35 S. C. 387 (1915).
IN Ibid.
2 Garden City Feeder Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
27 B. T. A. 1132 (1933).
S7Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co.,
59 F. (2d) 320 (1932); Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U. S. 220,
72 L. Ed. 249, 48 S. C. 87 (1927).
"Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27S
U. S. 716, 73 L. Ed. 918, 49 S. C. 499 (1929).
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and administrative remedies substituted for them. The effect,
of course, is to take whole classes of cases out of the courts, and
hand them over to administrative agencies to deal with in a pre-
scribed manner.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a railroad
commission empowered to hold hearings at which evidence was
presented and arguments put forth and, then, to determine what
regulations should issue was not performing a function essen-
tially judicial in character. The Court maintained that the
ascertainment of facts, or the reaching of conclusions upon evi-
dence taken in the course of a hearing of interested parties,
might be entirely proper in the exercise of executive or legis-
lative, as distinguished from judicial powers.29
From these instances, it may be observed that in the exer-
eise of their discretionary powers administrative bodies issue
commands to individuals in cases coming before them as well
as formulate regulations possessing the force of law. Such
hearings or investigations quite obviously are judicial insofar
as they are similar to the function of a court of law in securing
evidence in specific cases. However, they are not judicial in the
full sense of the term inasmuch as they are not proceedings for
the determination of rights between litigants who must abide by
the decisions rendered. It is when administrative proceedings
lead to the issuance of decrees directed to individuals and
directly affecting their personal rights or their property rights
that the judicial field is more nearly approached. Even in such
cases the courts have found it expedient to declare that adminis-
trative bodies may hold such proceedings if the courts are per-
mitted the right to see (1) that the requirements of due process
of law have been met, (2) that the administrative agencies have
not exceeded their statutory powers, and (3) that their proceed-
ings have otherwise been free from legal error.
With these considerations firmly in mind, precisely what is
the legal status of a board of zoning appeals? The answer is
simple: it has no precise status. For convenience, it may be
called a quasi-judicial body (and that term is about as accurate
and ambiguous as any). It is a quasi-judicial body, for it lacks
the power to issue a judgment in the sense of a final adjudication.
- Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 58 L. Ed.
229, 34 S. C. 48 (1913).
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In other words, after the board acts, the individual affected is
not concluded by the decision. He has the right to apply for
and obtain appropriate relief in a court of equity, in cases 44
arbitrary exercise of statutory power, or a ruling in excess of the
jurisdiction conferred. 30
fDegge v. Mitchcock, 229 U. S. 162, 57 L. Ed. 1135, 33 S. C. 639(1913).
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